How to counter Iran’s growing ties with China

Iran’s theocratic dictatorship, locked in confrontation with the United States, is drifting into China’s orbit. The Iran-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in Tehran last March and Iran’s joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in September underscore the expansion of political, economic and strategic ties between the two regimes.
These evolving ties have strengthened Iran’s ability to resist sanctions, eased its isolation and supported its efforts to achieve regional hegemony.
But Iran needs China more than China needs Iran. Washington should exploit this asymmetry by increasing the costs for Beijing of close ties with Iran, reducing its economic advantages and reducing the potential advantages for Tehran of close ties with China.
The Biden administration should closely monitor China-Iran relations and work with our allies to mitigate the dangers of this geopolitical alignment. Close cooperation with allies is necessary to strengthen US influence over China and Iran and help limit, if not prevent, a full-fledged Sino-Iranian alliance.
Specifically, the United States should:
Escalate sanctions on Iran. Recklessly rejecting the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy, the Biden administration has eased the application of many sanctions. This complacent and self-defeating policy has reduced US diplomatic influence over Iran.
This, in turn, has reduced the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in the nuclear negotiations, encouraged an increase in illicit Iranian oil exports to China, and lowered the obstacles to greater Sino-Iranian cooperation.
A return to the “maximum pressure” sanctions policy would not only increase the prospects for a satisfactory nuclear deal with Tehran, but would diminish China’s perceived benefits from trade with Iran by reducing Iran’s ability to pay. Chinese imports and increasing the risk that the current Iranian regime will be overthrown by the long-suffering Iranian people.
Stepping up sanctions would also undermine Tehran’s ability to fund its military buildup and fund its network of proxy militias and terror groups.
Pressure China to downplay its support for the rogue Iranian regime. Washington should point out that unless Beijing encourages Tehran to compromise on its nuclear program and end its proxy attacks, Iran is likely to continue on its current collision course with the United States and its allies. . This could undermine Chinese economic interests in the region and disrupt regional oil exports on which Beijing depends.
Apply sanctions on Chinese imports of Iranian oil. After President Biden’s election, China increased its imports of Iranian oil. The administration may mistakenly view its non-enforcement of sanctions against such illicit imports as an unspoken gesture of goodwill toward Tehran and Beijing, but goodwill matters little to these regimes.
Washington is expected to apply new sanctions targeting Chinese shipping networks and companies that facilitate this oil trade. China’s economic future depends much more on stable economic relations with the United States than on its much restricted trade with Iran.
Work with allies to undermine Chinese support for Iran. The Biden administration is expected to increase the costs and risks for Beijing of a rapprochement with Tehran, not only in terms of Sino-US relations but also in terms of China’s relations with other states threatened by Iran.
Chief among them are the Gulf Arab states and Israel, whose mutual concerns about Iran were a factor in establishing the Abraham Accords. China currently has much greater economic and trade relations with these countries than with Iran, and this imbalance is expected to worsen further due to US sanctions.
The bottom line is that the Biden administration should end its self-defeating policy of eagerly seeking to revive the flawed 2015 nuclear deal by releasing pressure on Iran. Going back to a maximum pressure approach is much more promising.
Such a pivot on sanctions would not only improve the chances of a satisfactory outcome of nuclear negotiations with Iran, but would reduce Beijing’s economic incentives to forge closer ties with Iran.
This article originally appeared in The Washington Times.
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